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Abstract
In the current age of trade and ¯nancial openness, local economies
in developing countries are becoming increasingly exposed to external in-
vestments. The objective of the proposed two-sector model with environ-
mental externalities is to provide an insight into the interaction between
external investors and local communities with a focus upon the di®erent
strategies and income sources available to each category. In this context,
analysis suggests that environmental regulations and incentives o®ered in
order to attract external capital investment (whether foreign or national)
may have an un-uniform impact on the two typologies of actors.
JEL Classi¯cation: F21, F43, D62, O11, O13, O15, O41, Q20
Keywords: foreign direct investments, environmental negative ex-
ternalities, structural changes, poverty alleviation.
1 Introduction
Processes of global integration of economies, urbanization and industrialization
and the growing demand for raw materials and commodities have increased
the exposure of rural economies to external in°uences and investments. Ex-
ternal investments may take the form of foreign direct investments (FDI) or
domestic capital °ows deriving from urban or richer areas. In both cases, the
in°ow of capital is usually regarded as bene¯cial for local economic growth and
poverty reduction. Many governments o®er signi¯cant inducements to attract
foreign investors and international ¯nancial institutions provide policy makers
with suggestions as to the most e±cient policies and measures to attract foreign
investments. Furthermore, both neoclassical and endogenous economic growth
¤Corresponding author; address: DEIR, University of Sassari, via Torre Tonda 34, 07100
Sassari, Italy. E-mail: angelo.antoci@virgilio.it
1theories have highlighted di®erent ways in which external capital in°ows can
stimulate economic growth. Credit constraints may be relaxed via new invest-
ments and capital in°ows, thus increasing domestic capital stock and facilitating
the accumulation of ¯nancial capital (Brems 1970). In economies with su±-
cient absorptive capacity, mergers, acquisitions and green¯eld investments may
generate spill-over e®ects on local ¯rms in the form of dissemination of new
technology, skills, managerial and marketing practices, access to wider distri-
bution networks, incentive to operate on a more competitive scale, acquisition
of greater capacity to penetrate export markets and development of upstream
and downstream links between local entrepreneurs and new investors (Findlay
1978, Lall 1978, Blomstrom and Wang 1992, De Mello 1997, Markusen and
Venables 1999, Barrios et al. 2003). Other potentially positive e®ects produced
by FDI include creation of employment, infrastructure development, expansion
of tax base, ¯scal revenues and foreign exchange earnings (Janeba 2004, Amiti
and Wakelin 2003, Li and Liu 2005). This may result in economic acceleration
which, in turn, may sustain a process of poverty reduction. Suitable condi-
tions required to produce such bene¯cial results for host economies have been
discussed at length in economic literature. Empirical ¯ndings and theoretical
arguments have underscored the key role of institutional and legal contexts, the
degree of the competition or complementarity with local activities, the extent
of the technological gap, the level of human capital and development of host
economies, the development of ¯nancial markets and receptiveness to trade, as
well as the role of investment regulations and labor intensity in investment sec-
tors (Blomstrom et al. 1994, Balasubramanyam et al. 1996, Borenzstein et. al.
1998, Lim 2001, Alfaro et al. 2004). In addition, the sectorial composition of
FDI has been regarded as a further factor which in°uences the growth of the
host economy. If the impact of FDI on the primary sector is considered to be
limited or even negative, more far reaching positive connections and spill-overs
are expected in the case of capital °ow into the manufacturing sector (UNCTAD
2001, Aykut and Sayek 2007, Chakrabortya and Nunnenkamp 2008). All these
conditions, identi¯ed in economic literature as being relevant in shaping the ef-
fects of growth of external capital °ows, may explain the considerable degree of
heterogeneity in the empirical research with regard to the nexus between FDI
and output growth.
Less attention has been dedicated to the potentially negative impacts of ex-
ternal capital investments notwithstanding the ¯ndings of some authors that in
certain countries foreign investments can harm local ¯rms and have negative
e®ects on economic growth in the short term (Saltz 1992, Aitken and Harrison
1999, Djankov and Hoekman 2000, Damijan et al. 2001, Konings 2001, Agosin
and Machado 2005, Herzer et. al. 2008). Moreover a number of studies sug-
gest that there may be a minimum level of absorptive capacity below which
productivity spill-overs from FDI are negligible or negative and that it is only
above this threshold that FDI generates positive e®ects (Barrios et al. 2005,
Girma 2005). One of the explanations put forward to account for such ¯ndings
is that of a possible negative competition impact which may dominate positive
spill-overs resulting in the crowding-out of domestic activities. However, most
2of these studies have focused on intra-industry and vertical competition, while
the impact of externalities across sectors has been often overlooked.
The objective of this paper is to develop a uni¯ed model which incorpo-
rates both the positive and the negative e®ects of external investment on local
communities. We focus on a scenario which includes some of the factors ne-
glected by the literature, but excludes others which have already been widely
discussed. The model considers inter-industry linkages, including environmental
externalities and incorporating direct positive impact of external capital °ows,
but it excludes other positive indirect e®ects. More precisely, the potential ef-
fect of poverty-reduction of external capital °ows operates through the labor
market by creating new labor opportunities and raising labor demand. Positive
spill-overs on host economies are, instead, excluded and local and new activities
are not connected by inward or forward linkages. Local and new activities are
characterized by di®erent production functions, that is, they belong to di®er-
ent sectors and they are not competitors1. In these cases, external investments
might be attracted by low labor costs, public incentives, high endowments or
the low cost of natural resources rather than by complementarities with local
¯rms. Secondly, we introduce the analysis of a type of externality which has
not received much attention in the debate on FDI impact on domestic ¯rms,
namely environmental damage. In the proposed model, local activities cause
environmental damage but external investors also cause negative externalities
on natural resources which are used by local ¯rms for production. Finally, it is
worth emphasising that although in the literature on FDI is a recognised term
of reference, in this model we use the term \external" to refer not just to foreign
investors, but also national entrepreneurs whose capital derived from a source
outside the local economy.
This scenario re°ects some characteristics of several developing countries
where national economies can be profoundly segmented and regionally di®er-
entiated in terms of economic development, access to capital markets and de-
pendence on natural resources. In some areas, local borrowing and investment
capacity is more limited than in other regions, human activities can be pro-
foundly dependent on environmental dynamics and natural systems are not just
amenities but also a means of subsistence or valuable economic services and
assets. In such settings, external investors usually hold the large majority of
man-made capital stock. Moreover, environmental externalities and resource
degradation can have a dramatic impact on local activities even if national ac-
counting and household surveys cannot capture them because the e®ects involve
only a circumscribed region or just informal activities or simply because envi-
ronmental services encounter problems of measurement. Indeed, all over the
world increasing struggle of local communities against external agents which
threaten their environment suggest that such interaction may not be insigni¯-
cant. Most cases of grassroots protests are against environmental degradation
caused by extractive, ¯shery and agriculture activities of large ¯rms. Case stud-
1Note that the main transmission channels of spill-overs are usually expected to be more
active within the same industry than across sectors.
3ies of struggles by poor communities to gain control over natural resources and
to deal with injustice and environmental degradation created by big compa-
nies, for instance, have been documented, among others, by Ghai and Vivian
(1992)2, Lee and So (1999)3, Martines-Alier (2002)4. In some cases, the impact
has been so devastating as to provoke worldwide media interest. For example,
both international press and international organizations (UNDP 2006) have ac-
knowledged that oil and gas exploration and exploitation, urbanization and
industrialization are pushing the Niger Delta towards ecological disaster with
dramatic consequences on social stability and on the life of the indigenous popu-
lation, nearly 60 per cent of whom depend on the natural environment for their
livelihood (UNDP 2006). Since the late Eighties, the impact on poverty and
deforestation produced by large mechanized agriculture, livestock and timber
activities has been analyzed by De Janvry and Garcia (1988), Heath and Bin-
swanger (1996), Leonard (1989). More recently, Chomitz (2008) has reviewed
other examples of the displacement of forest dwellers and the loss of assets caused
as a result of more wealthy players looking after their own interests. In other
cases, local communities are negatively a®ected by processes of industrialization
and urbanization. China provides some of the most symbolic examples of ru-
ral communities harmed by environmental externalities and disenfranchisement
from natural resource use caused by the arrival of new manufacturing ¯rms.
Heavy damages to agriculture and ¯shery sectors, other than health hazards,
caused by Chinese industrialization have been documented, amongst others, by
Economy (2004) and World Bank (2007). By way of example, it is estimated
that every year 1.8 percent of the value of Chinese agricultural output is dam-
aged by acid rains, and, as recently as 2003, ¯shery pollution accidents caused
losses to commercial ¯shery amounting to more than 500 million USD (World
Bank 2007), without taking into account the impact of chronic water pollution
and e®ects on self-consumption of ¯sh. Moreover, UNDP (2005) reported that
between 1987 and 2001, non agricultural projects are estimated to have brought
about land expropriation of 40-50 million Chinese farmers (whether legally or
illegally).
Finally, even if no consensus has been reached in literature on the \pollution
2This study investigates the action of grassroots movements against the owners of trawlers
in Kerala, and logging contractors and energy companies in Hymalayan region.
3Lee and So explore the proliferation of grassroots movements against investment- and
trade- induced problems in South Asia which, according to the authors, are often caused by
multinational corporations which extract raw materials or move their production plants in
this region.
4Martines-Alier describes the actions of Oilwatch, a south-south network concerned about
the loss of biodiversity and forests, soil and water pollution, violations of human rights and
indigenous territorial rights caused by oil and gas extraction in tropical countries. He also
deals with the growing social resistance against export oriented commercial shrimp farming in
several Asian and Latin American countries. In many cases, the expansion of legal or illegal
shrimp ponds has caused the eviction of small scale ¯shermen and the destruction of coastal
mangrove forests to the detriment of local communities. Finally he considers struggles against
mining activities responsible for depletion and contamination of water, air and soil pollution.
4havens hypothesis"5, empirical evidence 6 increasingly suggests that the adop-
tion of cleaner technologies and changes towards less environmentally intensive
consumption explain only a part of the reduction in the pollution intensity of
production systems in Northern countries. In fact the growth and composition
of imports have also signi¯cantly contributed to pollution reductions of high
income countries. The °ip-side of these processes is the absorption of environ-
mentally intensive industries by the developing countries. In addition, with the
fast economic growth of large and intensely populated emerging economies (such
as India, China, Brazil), the possibility for such countries to rely on changes in
level and composition of imports to reduce pollution may be restricted in the
future. All these factors suggest that the development process of today's de-
veloping countries cannot be viewed in isolation from environmental pressures
exerted by external forces. This paper is a step towards the analysis of the role
of these forces for poverty reduction.
The article is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the model;
section 4 investigates some possible dynamics that may emerge from the model;
section 5 contains comparative statics results and highlights their implications
in terms of welfare; section 6 draws conclusions.
2 The proposed model
We consider a small open economy with three factors of production: labor, a
renewable natural resource and physical capital. In this economy, agents be-
long to two di®erent communities: \External Investors" (I-agents) and \Local
Agents" (L-agents). Both communities are constituted by a continuum of iden-
tical individuals and the size of each community is equal to 1. The I-agents are
endowed with physical capital which can be invested in the economy in question
or elsewhere. We assume that they do not face credit constraints and their avail-
ability of physical capital is \unlimited". Therefore they will continue to invest
their capital in the economy as long as the return on capital generated is higher
than in other economies. I-agents also hire labor force and undertake all their
potential work - represented by a ¯xed amount of entrepreneurial activity - in
what we call \capitalistic sector" or \market sector". The asset of the L-agents
is laborforce and they have to choose how to distribute such asset between two
5The pollution havens e®ect is the delocalization of polluting industries to countries with
more lenient environmental controls and regulations as response to an increase in domestic
regulatory stringency. For a survey on this topic see Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004).
6Using data on U.S. regulations and trade with Canada and Mexico for 130 manufacturing
industries from 1977 to 1986, Levison and Taylor (2008), for instance, ¯nd that an 1% increase
in PAC predicts a 0.4% increase in net imports from Mexico and a 0.6% increase from Canada
and for the industries whose PAC increased most, the rise in net imports due to increased
pollution costs represents a considerable fraction of the increase in total trade volumes over
the period. Ghertner and Fripp (2007) analyze US trade data for 1998-2004 reaching similar
conclusions: the US has partially shifted the environmental impact of its consumption to
other countries through trade. Other direct and indirect evidences on outsourcing of dirty
industries are provided by Suri and Chapman, (1998), Fischer-Kowalski and Amann (2001),
Cole (2004).
5activities: working as employees for External Investors in the capitalistic sector
or direct exploitation of the natural resource. Let us say that \local sector" de-
notes production of the Local Agents. Given that L- and I- agents' investments
in physical capital follow di®erent mechanisms and rules, we assume that the
capital market is completely segmented and it is accessible only by the External
Investors, while Local Agents can invest only their savings. We assume that the
production functions of the two sectors satisfy Inada conditions, are concave,
increasing and homogenous of degree 1 in their inputs. The production function




E is the stock of a free access environmental resource;
L is the amount of time that the representative L-agent spends on local
sector production;
KL is the physical capital accumulated by the representative L-agent;
® > 0, ¯ > 0, ® + ¯ < 1 hold.
The L-agent's total amount of time is normalized to 1 and leisure is excluded,
thus 1¡L represents the L-agent's labor employed by the representative I-agent
as wage work. The production function of the representative External Investor
is represented by a Cobb-Douglas function:
YI = K
°
I (1 ¡ L)1¡° (1)
where KI denotes the stock of physical capital invested by the representative
I-agent in the economy. The I-agents choose their labor demand 1 ¡ L and
the stock of physical capital KI which they invest in the economy in order to
maximize their pro¯ts:
YI ¡ w(1 ¡ L) ¡ rKI
where w and r are, respectively, the wage and the interest rate, considered as
exogenously determined by each I-agent. However, the wage w is endogenously
set in the economy by the labor market equilibrium condition (we exclude the
import of labor from other economies), while r is an exogenous parameter. We
assume that KI in°ow is potentially unlimited. Therefore the dynamics of the
same are not linked to I-agents' savings but only to productivity of KI (which,
in turn, depends on L and KI).
This is a stylized scenario, but it can represent the main di®erences be-
tween capital accumulation dynamics which have their origin in the choices of
local populations and those generated by the choices of external investors who
enter small economies dominated by primary activities. The use of labor inten-
sive techniques, employment of family labor and constraints in access to credit
markets are often key features of the production activity of local communities.
External investors, in contrast, usually manage more capital intensive activi-
ties based on employment of wage labor. Their companies or ¯rms are able to
gain access to national and international capital markets; they therefore rely on
6¯nancing sources coming from outside the economy and their ability to accumu-
late physical capital is in no way comparable to local population's accumulation
potential. In addition, we assume that their production is characterized by a
higher degree of mobility because it relies on wage labor which is also available
in other economies and on physical capital that can be employed elsewhere 7.
Therefore they invest in a economy only if their investment is remunerative and
they can defend themselves against a reduction in labor or capital return in the
local economy by moving their capital to other markets. On the other hand,
without loss of plausibility, we assume that two productive inputs employed
by the local sector, namely labor and the natural resource, constitute capital
which is less mobile than physical. Consequently, local producers can rely on
fewer strategies than external investors in order to confront reduction in labor
or capital productivity. They can only choose the level of their savings and the
allocation of their labor between the two sectors. More precisely, we assume









LE¯L1¡®¡¯ + (1 ¡ L)w ¡ CL
where the positive parameter ± represents the subjective interest rate. The
representative local agent invests all his savings remaining after ¯nancing his
consumption CL in physical capital. His resources come from self-employment
in the local sector (K®
LE¯L1¡®¡¯) and from wage labor in the capitalistic sector
((1 ¡ L)w).
The dynamics of E are described by a logistic function modi¯ed by human
intervention:
¢
E = E(E ¡ E) ¡ ²Y L ¡ ´Y I
Y L and Y I are the aggregate values of YL and YI, respectively and ² and ´
are positive parameters measuring the environmental impact caused, respec-
tively, by the aggregate production of L and I-agents. The positive parameter
E represents the carrying capacity of the environmental resource.
Each economic agent considers to be negligible the e®ect of his choices on the
dynamics of E and does not internalize it. That is, Y L and Y I are considered
to be exogenous and this implies that the evolution of E is taken as given in
problem (2). As a result, they behave without taking into account the shadow
value of the natural resource and nobody has an incentive to preserve or restore
the same. Consequently, the resulting dynamics are not optimal. However, the
7In the real world, capital demobilization faces some constraints and it is often observed
that °ows of direct productive investment are more stable than portfolio °ows and bank
lending. However, in this model we compare local and external producers and we consider
that the degree of freedom in location choices is much higher for external investors than for
local small producers.
7trajectories under such dynamics are Nash equilibria, in the sense that no agent
has an incentive to modify his choices along each trajectory generated by the
model for so long as others do not modify theirs.
Working under the assumption that each typology of agents consists of a
continuum of identical individuals of size 1, (ex post) aggregate outputs Y L and
Y I coincide with pro-capite values YL and YI, respectively.
Problem (2) will be analyzed with the following restrictions on variables and
parameters: K, E > 0; ®, ¯, °, ±, ², ´, r, E > 0; ® + ¯ < 1.
3 Dynamics generated by the model
The dynamics generated by the model are obtained by applying the Maximum
Principle to the maximization problem of the representative L-agent, under
the equilibrium condition in the labor market. The current value Hamiltonian
function associated to problem (2) is (see Wirl 1997):
H = lnCL + ¸
£
K®
LE¯L1¡®¡¯ + (1 ¡ L)w ¡ CL
¤
where ¸ is the co-state variable associated to KL. By applying the Maximum






LE¯L1¡®¡¯ + (1 ¡ L)w ¡ CL (3)
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E = E(E ¡ E) ¡ ²Y L ¡ ´Y I (5)











(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)K®
LE¯L¡®¡¯ ¡ w
¤
= 0, i.e. w = (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)K®
LE¯L¡®¡¯
(7)
At the same time, the representative I-agent chooses the level of labor demand
1 ¡ L and physical capital KI employed in the capitalistic production in order
to maximize her pro¯t function:
¦I = K
°
I (1 ¡ L)1¡° ¡ w(1 ¡ L) ¡ rKI (8)
This gives rise to the following ¯rst order conditions:
@¦I
@(1 ¡ L)
= (1 ¡ °)K
°
I (1 ¡ L)¡° ¡ w = 0 (9)





I (1 ¡ L)1¡° ¡ r = 0 (10)
3.1 Labor market equilibrium
The labor market is perfectly competitive and wages are °exible. I- and L-
agents take w as given, but the wage rate and labor allocation between the two
sectors continue to change until the labor demand is equal to labor supply. The
labor market equilibrium condition is given by:
(1 ¡ °)K
°
I (1 ¡ L)¡° = (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)K®
LE¯L¡®¡¯ (11)






(1 ¡ L) (12)

















Function (13) identi¯es the labor market equilibrium value L¤ of L if the right










The economy is specialized in the production of the L-sector if L¤ = 1. Note
that condition 9 excludes the specialization in the production of the capitalistic
sector (i.e. L¤ > 0 always). Therefore two cases are distinguished, the case
without specialization (in the local sector) and the case with specialization.





®+¯ < 1, then L-agents spend a positive fraction of their time
endowment working in the capitalistic sector and condition (13) identi¯es the
value of L. Moreover, the following proposition holds:






Proof. By substituting (13) in (7) we obtain:
w = (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)K®
LE¯L¡®¡¯ =










































































®+¯ ¸ 1, then the L-agents spend all their time endowment working

















4 Analysis of dynamics: existence and stability
of stationary states
4.1 Preliminary results
A stationary state P¤ = (E¤;K¤







¸ = 0. From equation
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Consequently L¤ < 1 if and only if KL < ®±¡1¡¡®¡¯. This implies that the
stationary states without specialization lie, in the plane (E;KL), below the
straight line:
KL = KL := ®±¡1¡¡®¡¯ (23)
10while those with full specialization lie above it.
It is easy to check that, below KL, the stationary states (without special-
ization) are given by the intersections between the two following curves:
KL = f(E) := ­E (24)


















¤ > 0 if ² < ²¤ := ´
1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯
1 ¡ °
(28)
While, above KL, the stationary states (with specialization) are given by the
intersections between the following two curves:








KL = g1(E) :=
®
±²
E(E ¡ E) (30)
4.2 Multiplicity of stationary states
The following propositions deal with the problem of the existence and numeros-
ity of the stationary states of the dynamic system (3)-(5).
Proposition 2 The dynamic system (3)-(5) admits at most four stationary
states: A and B with L¤ < 1, A1 and B1 with L¤ = 1.
Proof. The graph of g(E) is a parabola while the graph of f(E) is a straight
line, consequently f(E) and g(E) have at most two intersections. Analogously,
















has at most two zeros with E > 0.
By the symbol A1 (respectively, B1) we shall refer to the stationary state
P¤ = (E¤;K¤





1(E¤)); analogously, by the symbol A (respectively, B)
we shall refer to the stationary state without specialization satisfying the condi-
tion sign(¤) = sign[f0(E¤) ¡ g0(E¤)] (respectively, sign(¤) = sign[g0(E¤) ¡ f0(E¤)]).
11To express the next proposition, we have to de¯ne the following threshold
values (see the proof of the proposition):
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Proposition 3 The stationary states of the dynamic system (3)-(5) are (see
Figure 1)9:
1) A, B, A1 and B1 if and only if (i®):
´ < ´T; ² > ²T; E3(²) < E < E2(²)
2) A and B i®:
´ < ´T; ² < ²T; E1(²;´) < E < E2(²)
or
´ < ´T; ² > ²T; E1(²;´) < E < E3(²)
3) A1 and B1 i®:
´ <
1 ¡ °
1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯




1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯
²T ²T < ² < ²¤; E3(²) < E < E2(²)
4) A and B1 i®:
E > E2(²)
No stationary state exists in the remaining cases.
9For simplicity, in this classi¯cation, we do not take into account the "non robust" cases
corresponding to an equality condition on parameter values (for example, the cases in which
´ = ´T, ² = ²T or E = E3(²)).
12Proof. Notice that: a) f(E) and f1(E) do not depend on the parameter
E (see (24) and (29)); b) if the value of the parameter E increases, the graph
of g(E) moves up (in the plane (E;KL)) in the case ¤ < 0 and moves down in
the case ¤ > 0; c) if the value of the parameter E increases, the graph of g1(E)
moves up.
The classi¯cation given in this Proposition, based on the values of the pa-
rameters E, ², ´ and represented in the plane (²;E) (see Figure 1), can be easily
checked considering that the thresholds values de¯ned in formulas (31)-(35) are
characterized by the following properties (which can be easily proved):
1) given ² and ´, the function E1(²;´) (see (31)) indicates the value of the
parameter E such that the curves f(E) and g(E) are tangent;
2) given ², the function E2(²) (see (32)) indicates the value of the parameter
E such that the curves f(E) and g(E) have an intersection point along the
horizontal line KL = KL (KL is de¯ned in (23)10;
3) given ², the function E3(²) (see (33)) indicates the value of the parameter
E such that the curves f1(E) and g1(E) are tangent;
4) the tangency point between the curves f1(E) and g1(E) lies above the
horizontal line KL = KL if and only if the condition ² > ²T (see (34)) is satis¯ed;
5) the tangency point between the curves f(E) and g(E) lies below the
horizontal line KL = KL if and only if the condition ´ < ´T (see (35)) is
satis¯ed;
6) ²¤ < ²T holds (remember that ¤ > 0 i® ² < ²¤, see (28)) if and only if
´ < ´ :=
1 ¡ °
1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯
²T, where ´ > ´T always holds;
7) the graphs of E1(²;´) and E2(²), in the plane (²;E), are two parallel
straight lines; they coincide for ´ = ´T while E1(²;´) lies below E2(²) for
´ 6= ´T;
8) the function E3(²) is strictly concave in ², its graph lies below the straight
line E2(²) and is always tangent to it for ² = ²T.
Remember that the parameter E represents the carrying capacity of the
environmental resource E while the parameters ² and ´ measure, respectively,
the environmental impact caused by the aggregate production of L-agents and
I-agents. Figure 1 shows the regions, in the plane (²;E), corresponding to cases
1-4 of the above proposition. Notice that:
i) case 1 (that in which the stationary states are A, B, A1, B1) can be only
observed for low enough values of ´ and high enough values of ², that is for
´ < ´T and ² > ²T respectively (see Figure 1.a);
ii) case 2 (that in which the stationary states are A, B) can be only observed
for low enough values of ´, that is for ´ < ´T (see Figure 1.a);
iii) for ´ > ´T, only case 3 (that in which the stationary states are A1, B1)
and case 4 (that in which the stationary states are A, B1) can occur;
iv) case 3 can be only observed in the context ¤ > 0 if the value of ´ is high
enough, that is for ´ >
1 ¡ °
1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯
²T (see Figure 1.c);
10Notice that, in such a case, the intersection point between f(E) and g(E) coincides with
that between f1(E) and g1(E).
13v) if, given ² and ´, the value of E is high enough, then only case 4 can be
observed (see Figures 1.a-1.c).
4.3 Stability
Let P¤ = (E¤;K¤;¸¤) be a stationary state of the dynamic system (3)-(5).
The stability properties of P¤ depend on the signs of the real parts of the
eigenvalues associated to the Jacobian matrix J evaluated at P¤. We shall say
that P¤ is saddle-point stable if J has two eigenvalues with negative real parts,
i.e. if P¤ has a 2-dimensional stable manifold. As a matter of fact, under the
perfect foresight assumption, if the stationary state has a 2-dimensional stable
manifold, given the initial values E(0) and K(0) of the state variables E and
K, L-agents are able to ¯x the initial value ¸(0) of the jumping variable ¸
so that the growth trajectory starting from (E(0);K(0);¸(0)) approaches P¤.
Therefore the stationary state can be reached by growth trajectories. If the
stationary state has less than two eigenvalues with negative real parts, then
given the initial values E(0) and K(0), a value ¸(0) does not (generically) exist
so that the growth trajectory starting from (K(0);E(0);¸(0)) approaches the
stationary state.
The following proposition concerns the stability properties of the stationary
states A1 and B1 in the regime with specialization (i.e. L¤ = 1).
Proposition 4 In the regime with specialization, we have that:
1) If f0
1(E¤) < g0
1(E¤) (that is, P¤ is of the type A1), then P¤ has two




1(E¤) (that is, P¤ is of the type B1), then P¤ is saddle-
point stable or it has three eigenvalues with strictly positive real parts; a su±cient







Proof. See Appendix A
The following proposition deals with the stability properties of the stationary
states A and B in the regime without specialization (i.e. L¤ < 1).
Proposition 5 In the regime without specialization, we have that:
1) If sign(¤) = sign[f0(E¤) ¡ g0(E¤)] (that is, P¤ is of the type A), then
P¤ has two eigenvalues with strictly positive real parts and one with strictly
negative real part.
2) If sign(¤) = sign[g0(E¤) ¡ f0(E¤)] (that is, P¤ is of the type B), then
P¤ is saddle-point stable or it has three eigenvalues with strictly positive real
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Figure 1: Threshold values in the plane (²;E) and existing stationary states.
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Figure 2: Numerical example in which four stationary states exist; the values
of parameters are: ® = 0:25, ¯ = 0:35, ° = 0:15, ± = 0:01, ² = 2, ´ = 0:1,
r = 0:01, E = 6:2.
16Proof. See Appendix B
A numerical example in which four stationary states A, B, A1 and B1
exist and both B and B1 are saddle-point stable is obtained posing ® =
0:001, ¯ = 0:003, ° = 0:01, ± = 0:08, ² = 0:5, ´ = 0:2, r = 0:01, E =
1:4245. In such an example, the coordinates of B and B1 are, respectively,
(K¤
L;E¤;L¤) = (0:0115;0:535;0:93) and (K¤
L;E¤;L¤) = (0:01243;0:8115;1),
and the corresponding eigenvalues are (¡2:1546;¡0:1645;2:3654) and (¡2:4888;
¡0:2003;2:5688).
When both B and B1 are saddle-point stable, a bi-stable regime occurs and
dynamics is path dependent in that the economy may reach B or B1 according
to the initial values of the state variables KL and E. Joining together the above
stability results and those concerning the existence of the stationary states, we
can observe that:
i) a bi-stable regime can occur only if ´ < ´T and ² > ²T (i.e. when all the
stationary states A, B, A1, B1 exist; see Figure 1.a);
ii) the case in which B is the unique saddle-point stable stationary state can
occur only if ´ < ´T (i.e. when only the stationary states A, B exist; see Figure
1.a);
iii) if, given ² and ´, the value of E is high enough, then B1 becomes the
unique saddle-point stable stationary state (see Figures 1.a-1.c).
5 Comparative statics
The following proposition helps to identify the most signi¯cant conditions that
are veri¯ed in correspondence with the stationary states of dynamics; the aster-
isk indicates the stationary state values of the variables.














































Furthermore, in the context L¤ < 1 (stationary states A and B), the follow-
ing condition holds:
C¤










17Proof. Formula (36) has been proved in subsection 3.1 (see (14)) while
formula (37) follows from (12) and (36). To prove (38), let us remember that
¢
KL = 0 holds for (see (3)):
CL = K®
LE¯L1¡®¡¯ + w(1 ¡ L) (40)
and
¢




Multiplying both sides of (41) by KL we get ±
®KL = K®
LE¯L1¡®¡¯; substi-



















































Notice that the value of KL evaluated at the stationary state B1 is higher
than that evaluated at B (when both B1 and B exist) because B1 lies above
the line (see (23)) KL = KL := ®±¡1¡¡®¡¯ while B lies below it. Therefore,
from (38) and (39), it follows that:
Proposition 7 When both the stationary states B1 and B exist, then L-agents'
welfare (measured by CL) evaluated in B1 is higher than that evaluated in B11.
The following propositions investigate the impact of a change in parameters
(in particular, we focus our analysis on E, ², ´, r) on the values of K¤
L, K¤
I,
E¤, L¤, Y ¤
I and C¤
L evaluated at B, the stationary state without specialization
that can be saddle-point stable. By the symbols x " and x # we shall indicate,
respectively, an increase and a decrease in the parameter or variable x.
Proposition 8 E " (remember that E represents the carrying capacity of the
environmental resource) implies E¤ ", K¤
L ", L¤ ", C¤
L " and K¤
I #.
Proof. See Appendix C
Proposition 9 ² " or ´ " (remember that ² and ´ represent, respectively, the
environmental impact of L-agents and I-agents) imply E¤ #, K¤




11We do not consider the stationary states A1 and A because they cannot be saddle-point
stable.
18Proof. See Appendix C
The comparative statics carried out on ² and ´ pinpoints the consequences
of considering environmental dynamics. The results show that a lower environ-
mental regulation, which translates into higher levels of ² or ´, tends to stimulate
a labor movement towards the external sector, whose productive performances
have not worsened by environmental degradation. The local community faces
a reduction in return in the context of self-employment and is pushed towards
wage employment, partially substituting self-employed labor with wage labor.
In such a context, the expansion of external capital in°ows does not help local
agents. On the contrary, their welfare declines. A symmetrically opposed e®ect
is produced by an increase in E, which translates into an increase in the welfare
of L-agents and a reduction in the investments of I-agents.
Proposition 10 If ¤ > 0 (i.e. ² < ²¤), then r " always implies E¤ " and
K¤
L ". If ¤ < 0 (i.e. ² > ²¤), then:
1) r " implies E¤ " if:
´ >
²(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)2
¯ + (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)3 (42)






















±­(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)2
3) r " implies K¤
L " if and only if:
1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯
¯






Furthermore, (42) is a su±cient condition to have K¤
L ".
Proof. See Appendix C
Remember that, according to Proposition 6, KL is positively correlated with




























19Figure 4) shows a graphical representation of the results of some numerical
exercises. A reduction in r can be interpreted as a reduction in external agents'
opportunity cost of capital investment in the economy. These exercises of com-
parative statics highlight a novel requirement such that capital in°ows can drive
a process of poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. In all scenarios
a decline in r leads to a labor reallocation towards the modern sector, resulting
in an expansion of this sector and a diminution of the subsistence sector. The
e®ects on the welfare of local agents, however, depend on the relation between
parameters representing environmental impacts generated by the two sectors
(² and ´): the expansion of external investments due to a decline in r results
in a poverty reduction (i.e. an increase in C¤
L) only if the capitalistic sector
does not cause too much pollution, namely if it produces relatively low envi-
ronmental externalities in comparison to the subsistence activities where the
di®erence between ² and ´ is adjusted for the ratio between labor productivity
in the two sectors. Moreover, this economic transition leads to an increase in
environmental sustainability (i.e. an increase in E¤) only if ² is su±ciently large
with respect to ´ (¤ is su±ciently negative).
6 Concluding remarks
An improvement in the investment climate is one of the main objective of most
local and national governments all over the world. The promotion of incentives
and of opportunities for ¯rms to invest and to create jobs is regarded as a crucial
strategy in order to stimulate economic growth and to reduce poverty. The eco-
nomic doctrine has underscored both the need to mobilize domestic resources
and to attract external capitals and several international organizations12 have
suggested measures for promoting domestic investments and improving invest-
ment climate. In poor economies, however, in°ows of external investments are
seen by policy makers as the main solution to tackle scarcity of domestic capitals
and to escape a poverty trap of low investments - low growth - poverty perpet-
uation. Expansion of modern activities, prompted by the arrival of external
investors, are considered to be the way forward in terms of economic expan-
sion and diversi¯cation of the local economy. Many countries, therefore, have
focused their e®orts on reforms and inducements which aim to promote modern
and big companies usually ¯nanced by external capitals. The proposed model
has enabled us to discuss the impact of these policies on an underdeveloped eco-
nomic system based on primary activities. In our simpli¯ed economy, policies
for attracting external investors can be identi¯ed by parameter r which stands
for I-agents' opportunity cost to invest physical capital in the local economy.
A reduction in r, for example, can represent interventions that bene¯t exter-
nal investors such as more favorable taxation, regulation, provision of services
12The World Development Report 2005, for example, points out that climate investment
improvements are driving factors in boosting economic expansion and combating poverty and
it recommends the promotion of domestic investments and support of small and rural ¯rms
(World Bank 2005).












































(a) ² = 0:1, ´ = 1






































(b) E = 5, ´ = 1










































(c) E = 5, ² = 0:1
Figure 3: Values of K¤
L, K¤
I, E¤, L¤, Y ¤
I and C¤
L evaluated at B, varying the
parameters E, ² and ´; the other parameters are ¯xed at the values: ® = 0:1,
¯ = 0:35, ° = 0:2, ± = 0:01, r = 0:01.
and infrastructures, political climate and the enforcement of property rights or,
more intuitively, a reduction in r can be considered as a subsidy for I-agents.
In this context a decline in the opportunity cost of external capital invest-
ment prompts a process of diversi¯cation: the economy reaches a stationary
state associated with the expansion of the capitalistic sector driven by higher
levels of physical capital and labor employment, while investment in the subsis-
tence sector decreases. The impact on environmental preservation and welfare
of local communities, however, is not always positive. Indeed, if the modern
sector is much more environmentally demanding by comparison with the local
sector, the equilibrium value of natural capital declines and C¤
L decreases. In
conclusion, the model shows that new scenarios may emerge when environmen-
tal dynamics are included in the discussion on the interaction between local and
external producers. In particular, the increasing exposure of local economies to
21external forces and investments can cause perverse consequences when incoming
actors invest in contaminating industries and enter economies characterized by
a high dependence on primary activities and, consequently, by an acute vul-
nerability to environmental degradation or to exclusion from the use of natural
resources. In this case, not only is the promotion of external investments not
very e®ective in the struggle against poverty and environmental degradation,
but it may actually exacerbate these problems. These conclusions, however,
have to be evaluated in the lights of some important remarks. Firstly, in our
model, positive externalities and backward or forward linkages between the two
sectors are excluded. The inclusion of these channels of interaction between the
two sectors may, in fact, limit or downsize the results obtained by this model.
Our objective, however, was to focus on factors that tend to be neglected in the
discussion of investment incentives, namely the environmental externalities of
human activities and agents' heterogeneity in terms of vulnerability to depletion
of natural resources.
Secondly, in the context in question, L-agents cannot, by assumption, employ
wage labor. Therefore this is a short-medium term model because, if in the long
run the economy reaches a su±ciently high level of KL, this assumption cannot
hold and the local sector could undertake a process of expansion limited only
by the endowment of natural capital but not by labor scarcity.





































(a) ² = 0:1, ´ = 1, ¤ > 0







































(b) ² = 2, ´ = 1, ¤ < 0













































(c) ² = 0:1, ´ = 5, ¤ > 0
Figure 4: Values of K¤
L, K¤
I, E¤, L¤, Y ¤
I and C¤
L evaluated at B, varying the
parameter r; the other parameters are ¯xed at the values: ® = 0:1, ¯ = 0:35,
° = 0:2, ± = 0:01, E = 5.
237 Appendix A
This Appendix and Appendix B are built on Wirl's results (1997). The Jaco-
bian matrix J1(P¤), evaluated at a stationary state with specialization P¤ =

































The eingenvalues of J1(P¤) are the roots of the following characteristic polyno-
mial:
P1(z) = z3 ¡ tr(J1)z2 + Mz ¡ jJ1j
where:






























1 are the derivatives of f1 and g1 evaluated at E¤. Therefore,
jJ1j ? 0 for f0
1(E¤)¡g0
1(E¤) ? 0. Since, at the stationary state A1, the condition
f0
1(E¤) < g0
1(E¤) holds, A1 is either a saddle with two eingenvalues with strictly
positive real parts or a sink; however, A1 cannot be a sink in that, by (43),
jJ1j > 0 implies tr(J1) > 0.
At the stationary state B1, the condition f0
1(E¤) > g0
1(E¤) holds; therefore
B1 is either a saddle with two eingenvalues with strictly negative real parts









a su±cient condition for the saddle-point stability of B1. This completes the
proof.
248 Appendix B
The Jacobian matrix J(P¤), evaluated at a stationary state without specializa-

































The eingenvalues of J(P¤) are the roots of the following characteristic polyno-
mial:
P1(z) = z3 ¡ tr(J)z2 + Mz ¡ jJj
where:
tr(J) = ± +
¯¤­
® + ¯
+ E ¡ 2E¤ (44)
M = ±(E ¡ 2E¤) ¡
¯±










It is easy to check that the determinant jJj can be expressed as follows:
jJj =
¯±
(® + ¯)K¤¸¤¤[g0(E¤) ¡ f0(E¤)]
where f0 and g0 are the derivatives of f and g evaluated at E¤. Therefore, jJj ? 0
for ¤[g0(E¤) ¡ f0(E¤)] ? 0. Since, at the stationary state A, the condition
¤[g0(E¤) ¡ f0(E¤)] < 0 holds, A is either a saddle with two eingenvalues with
strictly positive real parts or a sink. However, as in Appendix A, we can easily
exclude the attractivity of A. Notice that E ¡ 2E¤ > 0 always holds in A (see
(25) and the de¯nition of A); this implies that tr(J) > 0 if ¤ > 0 (see (44). If
¤ < 0, then jJj < 0 if and only if ­¤ + E ¡ 2E¤ > 0 (see (46)), which implies
tr(J) > 0 (see (44).
At the stationary state B, jJj > 0 holds; therefore B is either a saddle with
two eingenvalues with strictly negative real parts or a source. Wirl (1997) ¯nds
that a positive determinant and a negative coe±cient M are su±cient conditions
for saddle-point stability. Notice that, if ¤ > 0, the condition E¡2E¤ < 0 holds
(see (25) and the de¯nition of B) and consequently M < 0. In case ¤ < 0, from











25Substituting in (45) and remembering that K?






























This completes the proof.
9 Appendix C
Let us rewrite equations (24) and (25) as follows:







¡ E(E ¡ E)
¤
= 0 (49)
Di®erentiating equations (48) and (49) with respect to the parameter y = E, ²,





























9.1 Proof of Proposition 8

































member that ¤[g0(E) ¡ f0(E)] > 0 at the stationary state B). The part of the
Proposition concerning the e®ects of an increase in E (and, consequently, in KL)
on the values of L, CL and KI can be easily checked by applying Proposition 6.
269.2 Proof of Proposition 9

















1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯
1 ¡ °
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¡­¤E (equation obtained by equal-



















Being KL = ­E < KL, where KL =
±(1 ¡ °)






expression in square brackets is strictly positive; therefore
@E
@´




< 0 holds. The part of the Proposition concerning the e®ects
of an increase in ´ on the values of L, CL and KI follows from Proposition 6.
The comparative statics results about the parameter ² can be easily checked
following the same steps.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 10





































°(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)
¯r(1 ¡ °)
­ > 0 (54)























Notice that, if ¤ > 0, then
@E
@r

















±­(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)[²(1 ¡ °) ¡ ´(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)]
Remembering that, in B, KL = ­E < KL =
±(1 ¡ °)











±­(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)(²(1 ¡ °) ¡ ´(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯))
we obtain the su±cient condition for
@E¤
@r
> 0 given in the Proposition.
The su±cient condition for
@E¤
@r
< 0 is obtained by following similar steps.
Remember ¯rst that, for E = E1 (see Appendix A), the curves f(E) and g(E)
are tangent; it is easy to check that, at the tangent point, E =
p
£ holds.
This implies that, for E > E1, E >
p
£ holds at the stationary state B.
13Remember that, at the stationary state B, sign(¤) = sign[g0(E¤) ¡ f0(E¤)] holds.
28Therefore, the su±cient condition for
@E¤
@r



















1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯
· 0
Let us now consider the variations in KL, L and KI generated by an increase in
r. Remember that, according to Proposition 6, KL is positively correlated with











if ¤ > 0, then
@KL
@r
> 0. If ¤ < 0, the inequality
@KL
@r
> 0 can be written as




















> 0 if and only if:
1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯
¯
E(E ¡ 2E) ¡ £ < 0
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